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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the developing field of the use of private modern forces in the armed 
conflicts. Due to the active participation in several missions states as well as international 
organisations have supplemented their possibilities to take part in conflicts by hiring private 
modern forces.  
Even if there are several legal international norms that examine the acts of war, including the 
private modern forces, they have several insufficiencies. 
For instance, it was discovered that existing legal norms have almost inapplicable definition 
of mercenaries due to its specific requirements. As well as there is no definition of PMCs in 
the existing legal framework, except of one - Montreux document, which is not legally 
binding. Consequently, the private modern forces are put under examination for every 
possibility for entailing the accountability for their actions due to the fact that their status has 
to be determined from the existing definitions – mercenaries, combatants or civilians. 
In addition, there are numerous international legal acts that deal with accountability of 
activities taken by mercenaries or PMCs, such as Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, 
Additional Protocols, OAU Convention, and UN Convention. Some of them lack relevant 
legal norms, others lack the territorial applicability or ratification. Nevertheless, there are 
several shortcomings in the existing international legal norms. The previously mentioned 
Montreux document addresses those shortcomings by providing several guidelines to the 
states as well as IOs. Montreux document also was the first and the only document to provide 
the definition of PMCs. 
The thesis also discusses in detail the responsibility of states and IOs. For instance, what 
responsibility can be entitled to contracting state of PMCs as well as what responsibility 
might be assigned to territorial states or home states. There are some differences between the 
responsibilities of states, nevertheless, all of them have to fulfil the obligations under ARS, 
meaning that states have to do everything in their power to avoid and, if necessary, to act in 
order to terminate any activities that can constitute a wrongful act according to international 
law. Consequently, according to ARS also the omission is considered to be a wrongful act of 
that state. The regulation of the responsibility of IOs under DARIO is somewhat similar as for 
states.  
The individual responsibility of PMC employees is being evaluated in two levels – 
international and national. Even though there exists a possibility that individuals may be 
prosecuted under international criminal law, meaning Rome Statute, there arise several 
complications in order to assign to PMCs the large scale crimes that are prosecuted in ICC, 
such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against of humanity.  
Consequently, the individual responsibility mainly relies on the national jurisdictions and 
domestic laws of the states, which quite differ in each state. Nevertheless, several of states 
lack necessary law requirements to be able to successfully hold responsible PMCs. Also 
corporate responsibility is the responsibility of national states as international laws do not 
does not provide legal framework for responsibility of legal entities. As national laws quite 
differ and some lack quite a lot of important mechanisms to deal with accountability of PMCs 
and their employees, Montreux document has proposed several guidelines that states should 
follow. 
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Accordingly, the thesis analyse the insufficiencies in international legal norms with regard to 
the PMCs as well as discusses the difficulties of application of certain norms. Afterwards 
several alternatives are proposed in order to deal with accountability of modern private forces 
more efficiently. These alternatives include such options as establishment of the responsible 
institution, new legal convention, minimum requirements for national states laws, licensing 
requirements as well as necessity for monitoring, control and enforcement mechanisms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The issue of modern private forces firstly was brought up during the Cold War when 
frequently mercenaries were used in conflict in Africa. The questions regarding the 
accountability were even more intensified in the 21st century after conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan where private forces were a significant part during this time as well as in modern 
warfare.
1
 
The term mercenaries and the use of such private forces has already been discussed in the end 
of 20th century. Contrary, the use of Private Military and Security Contractors (hereinafter 
referred to as PMCs) is a quite new field and international legal framework has not been 
sufficiently developed in order to control the use of PMCs.  
For instance, the term mercenary has already been determined in several legal conventions 
while limiting the use of the forces that conform with such definitions. PMCs have not yet 
been precisely defined in any of the binding international legal documents, thus leaving a gap 
for interpretation, misunderstandings or completely unregulated field of law. 
As the definition and regulation of private forces such as mercenaries and PMCs is quite 
ineffective and lacks not only adequate definitions that could be applied for modern private 
forces that are used today, but also do not provide control and enforcement mechanisms, it 
has resulted in uncertainty and diverse views for and against the use of private forces as such. 
Due to the lack of certainty the question regarding the accountability of the actions taken by 
mercenaries and PMCs is frequently discussed. 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to discuss the issue of accountability for the actions taken 
by mercenaries and PMCs. As this practice has further developed only in the last decades it is 
still not clear on how to evaluate the actions taken by mercenaries and PMCs and who should 
be held responsible for their actions in each case - whether it is a responsibility of a hiring or 
employing state or rather individual responsibility of private contractors or corporate 
responsibility of private security and military companies. The thesis also will discuss whether 
the existing international legal framework is sufficient for assessing the conduct of 
mercenaries and PMCs in order to bring justice and if not, what alternatives could be 
considered.  
Accordingly, the thesis research question is: What legal complications may be encountered 
when assessing the conduct of mercenaries and private military and security contractors 
in the existing international legal framework?  
In order to answer to the research question and determine, what are the legal difficulties of 
applying existing international legal tools when examining activities of mercenaries and 
PMCs in order to hold someone accountable for their actions, the analysis will be made 
throughout the thesis.   
Firstly, the meaning of mercenaries and PMCs will be analysed as well as differences 
between them in order to understand the variety of private forces used throughout the time 
form Cold War till nowadays. Further on, the role of the existing international legal tools will 
be analysed when governing the activities of mercenaries and PMCs, while indicating the 
                                                 
1
 Lam Jenny S. “Accountability for Private Military Contractors Under the Alien Tort Statute.” CALIFORNIA 
LA W REVIEW 1459 (2009). p 1459 
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shortcomings in each of the legal tools in order to understand the main issues of the use of 
private forces in a modern warfare. Moreover, also the responsibility of a state will be 
discussed - responsibility of a hiring state; sending state and the responsibility of a state in 
which territory the activities are carried out. This chapter will also briefly touch upon the 
institutional responsibility of international organisations that use private forces in their 
operations. And finally the sufficiency of the existing legal tools when examining the 
individual and corporate liability of mercenaries and PMCs will be discussed and analysed in 
order to underline the main problems that arise when the accountability of private forces is 
questioned. In this chapter after examining the sufficiency of already existing legal tools the 
possible alternatives will be proposed by the author for international legal tools as well as 
actors taking part in ensuring the successful enforcement of laws.  
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CHAPTER I THE DEFINITION OF MERCENARIES AND PRIVATE MILITARY 
CONTRACTORS IN THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
In order to analyse the legal framework and existing problems of a use of private forces in the 
modern warfare it is important to understand the meaning of terms “mercenary” and “PMC” 
as well as the main differences between them. As the use of mercenaries is prohibited 
completely in several countries while PMCs are not precisely defined at all, thus much 
depend on the interpretation of law, it is crucial to differentiate between both in all cases. For 
the purpose of understanding the development of knowledge of private forces, the legal tools 
will be discussed in chronological order. 
1.1. Definition of mercenaries in the existing legal framework  
Mercenaries have been defined in several conventions already since the end of Cold War. 
Nevertheless, most of the existing definitions are very precise or inflexible and consist of 
several components that determine concrete criteria that have to be existent simultaneously in 
every case, thus it very much limits the opportunity of actually applying these norms to the 
modern private forces that are used today.  
For instance, in international humanitarian law the definition of mercenaries is focused 
mainly on two elements - nationality of a person and motivation to participate in the 
operation. Meaning that the main elements of the norm have been created based on concerns 
about the legitimate control of mercenaries, as frequently they do not belong to the 
jurisdictions they operate with, as well as the usual motivation and purpose for carrying out 
their activities is due to financial reasons, not attachment to the state involved or cause of the 
operation. Accordingly, the norms were based on doubts about the possible illegal, 
unauthorised and unreasonable activities carried out by mercenaries due to the lack of 
legitimate control and non-existent motivation connected to the purpose of conflict itself. 
2
 
The Convention (V) respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case 
of War on Land (herewith and after below referred to as Hague Convention (V)), which 
entered into force in 1910 does not have a precise definition of a mercenary, nor does it 
mention a term mercenary throughout the Convention. Nevertheless, Article 4 of the 
convention determines that “[c]orps of combatants cannot be formed […] on the territory of a 
neutral Power to assist the belligerents”,3 therefore, even if the precise term ‘mercenary’ is not 
used, it can be interpreted that Hague convention (V) refers to mercenaries as ‘corps of 
combatants’ that are neutral to the conflict and involved parties and are created to assist other 
belligerents. Consequently, even the term ‘mercenary’ was not yet mentioned in that time of 
creation of convention, the basic ideas and concerns were already present in order to create 
such norm of prohibition. 
Similarly as under Hague Convention (V) Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not include a 
precise definition of mercenaries either, nor the term ‘mercenary’ has been mentioned 
                                                 
2
 Kochheiser Steven R.”Silent Partners: Private Forces, Mercenaries, and International Humanitarian Law in the 
21st Century.” The University of Miami National Security & Armed Conflict Law Review 86, (2012), p. 91. 
3
 Convention (V) respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land. The 
Hague, 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910.  
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throughout the Geneva Conventions. There have been several discussions of reasons for not 
including the mercenaries into the law with opposite views from scholars. It was argued that 
the definition of mercenaries might have not been included due to the fact that Geneva 
Conventions do not recognise the use of private forces as such as they cannot be considered as 
combatants (combatant status will be discussed further below). Or completely opposite angle 
was that Geneva Conventions apply to all fighters equally, therefore, no distinction between 
mercenaries and other fighters is required.
4
 Nevertheless, most scholars after examining the 
interpretation of norms of Geneva Conventions (relevant norms will be discussed further 
within theses in Chapter II) agree that they were meant for all fighters, whether combatants, 
mercenaries or others, therefore, even if there is no definition or mentioning of mercenaries as 
such, it shall be understood as applying for every single fighter of a conflict in question. 
Even though Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not mention the mercenaries at all, completely 
opposite approach has been used in Additional Protocols to Geneva Conventions of 1977. 
Additional Protocol I contains a specific definition of a mercenary while proposing several 
criteria that have to be simultaneously present in each case in order to define fighters as 
mercenaries. Paragraph 2 of article 47 determines that a mercenary is: 
a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to  fight in an armed conflict; 
b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain 
and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar 
ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by 
a Party to the conflict; 
e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a 
member of its armed forces.
5
 
Additional Protocol I was the first legal document to include a precise definition of 
mercenaries. However, the definition is with such a detailed character that it narrows and 
limits its use in very inflexible way, thus it can be applied in very rare cases during the 
modern warfare. 
This definition requires the fighter is a private person that is directly participating in hostilities 
with a motivation of a private gain and cannot be nationally linked or be resident to the party 
of the conflict. The issue of motivation in article 47(2)(c) is that it is unrealistic to prove or 
interpret the motivation of an individual to participate in any activities while taking part in 
hostilities. Unfortunately, without the acceptable definition of one’s motivation it is 
impossible to refer someone as a mercenary as it is one of the basic requirements to constitute 
a mercenary. Moreover, part (c) also sets an additional requirement of being materially 
compensated for participating in the conflict. It is not clear whether these requirements are 
meant to be connected and dependent on each other when interpreting this paragraph. 
Nevertheless, it sets an obligation that in order to be referred to as a mercenary one should 
                                                 
4
 Op. cit. Kochheiser. ”Silent Partners” p. 97 
5
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force 7 December 
1978. Article 47. 
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have not only a specific motivation to participate in the hostilities that is not connected to the 
honour or commitment to one of the conflict parties, but also has to be materially 
compensated for the participation and actions taken. Thus, determining another requirement, 
which is subject to question of proof.
6
 
This definition consists of that many specific elements that it limits the possibility of 
application of the norm in majority of cases. Thereof, it is clearly determined that all other 
private forces that do not fall within the criteria of this definition, are not mercenaries, thus 
are not prohibited to use by law. 
It has to be noted that this definition is also acquired at international customary law level, 
therefore, is accepted as ius cogens norm and shall be applicable to all states, even if they are 
not member of the Additional Protocol I. Nevertheless, the narrow and inflexible definition 
that is used as custom does not ensure a successful regulation of mercenaries as only in rare 
occasions modern warfare private forces do fall within this definition as it is almost 
impossible to prove the motivation of a person to participate in a warfare by receiving a 
financial reward, even less possibility to apply all six criteria that are required to be declared 
as a mercenary.
7
 
As mentioned above, the term mercenaries was frequently used due to the conflicts in Africa 
where private mercenaries were often used. Due to the reemergence of the use of mercenaries 
during the post-colonial Africa the Convention of African Unity (OAU) for the Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa (hereinafter referred to as OAU Convention) was invented in order to 
criminalise the acts of mercenaries.
8
 
In contrast to the previously discussed international legal tools OAU Convention defines not 
only the mercenaries itself, but also the crime of mercenarism. 
As the definition of mercenaries was invented at the same time when Additional Protocol I 
was established, the definition is almost identical to the one of Additional protocol I. that was 
discussed above.
9
 The only difference is in the subparagraph (c) with regard to motivation and 
compensation of the actions taken by the mercenaries. As in Additional Protocol I the amount 
of the material compensation was specified in a way so that it has to be significantly higher 
than the sum that is being paid to the other combatants of the same rank and/or providing 
similar activities or tasks; OAU Convention determines that the motivation to take part in 
hostilities in order to get private gain and the fact itself that they are being materially 
compensated (without any further requirements of the amounts paid) is sufficient, therefore, 
this definition slightly reduces the inflexible and almost unrealistic requirements to be 
referred to as a mercenary. Nevertheless, the main idea and the problem of issue of proof of 
the fighter’s motivation and evidence that they have been materially compensated, which has 
resulted in their motivation to take part in hostilities, is still unavoidable. Therefore, the 
similar problems of definition of mercenaries are observed when applying this definition to 
the modern private forces as with Additional Protocol I and customary international norms - 
the rule is too inflexible and strict to be actually applied in majority of cases. 
                                                 
6
 Fallah Katherine “Corporate actors: the legal status of mercenaries in armed conflict.” International Review of 
the Res Cross Vol. 88, No. 863 (2006), p. 605-606. 
7
 International Committee of the Red Cross. Customary IHL: Rule 108. Mercenaries. Available at: https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule108 Accessed: May 8, 2017. 
8
 Op. cit. Kochheiser. ”Silent Partners” p. 102 
9
 Supra note 5  
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In addition to the definition of a mercenary, the OAU Convention also defines the crime of 
mercenarism as the convention was intended to criminalise the activities and use of 
mercenaries as such. 
The OAU Convention determines that the crime can be committed by either - whether an 
individual person, a group or union of persons, a state representative or even a state as such, 
supposing that this state aims to disturb or interfere in one’s self-determination or territorial 
integrity, and thus commits the following activities: 
a) Shelters, organises, finances, assists, equips, trains, promotes, supports or in any 
manner employs bands of mercenaries; 
b) Enlists, enrols or tries to enrol in the said bands; 
c) Allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried out in any territory 
under its jurisdiction or in any place under its control or affords facilities for transit, 
transport or other operations of the above mentioned forces.
10
 
The definition of a crime of mercenarism is clear and could be applied in many cases, 
however, as it has to be read and applied in conjunction with the definition of a term 
mercenary, it loses its enforceability as in majority of cases of modern warfare the definition 
of mercenaries may not be applied, thus also the definition of a crime becomes irrelevant as a 
subject of it is almost inexistent.  
Taking into account the aforementioned, it can be concluded that the main difference of the 
OAU Convention in comparison with other international legal tools is that other legal tools 
define mercenaries for including and differentiating them as such while OAU Convention 
defines mercenaries with an aim to punish them if they fall within the requirements of the 
definition. Nevertheless, if the definition of mercenary may not be applied in a case, also the 
regulation of criminalisation of mercenarism becomes irrelevant and inapplicable to the 
modern private forces. 
Another international legal tool that established the definition of mercenaries is the 
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries (hereinafter referred to as UN Convention). This convention came into force 
only in 2001, which is rather late when comparing to other legal documents. The Convention 
has been ratified by 35 states, the latest one Ecuador completing the ratification on December 
2016. Unfortunately, the main states that are involved with the usage of private forces, such as 
United States, United Kingdom, Russia and others have not ratified the UN Convention as it 
would limit their use of private forces.
11
 
The same as OAU Convention, the UN Convention uses the basis of already existing 
definition of mercenaries that was included in the Additional Protocol I. 
12
 In contrast to the 
Additional Protocol I   there have been some developments that broadens the applicability of 
the definition. For instance, one of the changes is that UN Convention has excluded from the 
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 Convention of the OAU for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. Libreville, 3rd July 1977, entered into 
force 22 April 1985. Article 1(2). 
11
 United Nations Treaty Collection. Status of Treaties: International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries. Available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-6&chapter=18&clang=_en. 
Accessed May 20, 2017. 
12
 Supra note 5  
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definition the sub-paragraph that defines that a mercenary should in fact take part in 
hostilities.
13
 
The second, more significant difference is that the article that contains the definition consists 
not only of the existing definition, but also adds additional paragraph that determines the 
conditions under which a person may be considered as a mercenary outside the context of 
armed conflict. The content of this paragraph is similar to the one discussed above, but it is 
adapted so that it would be applicable to other situations even if no armed conflict is ongoing. 
Nevertheless, according to this newly invented paragraph a mercenary may be any person 
who is participating in a violent act with a purpose to undermine a territorial integrity or 
constitutional order of a state. As well as the same criteria for motivation of private gain and 
material compensation are included. The rest of the criteria are similar, just adopted so that 
“parties of the conflict” would be broadened to the states and territories where activities take 
place, independently of the existence of the armed conflict.
14
 
This paragraph significantly broadened the definition as it was known until then and lessened 
the threshold and level of inflexibility of application of such definition to the modern private 
forces. Nevertheless, the same issues are present regarding the conditions of the proof of 
motivation that the fighter is participating with an aim to private gain and that the material 
compensation is promised or already granted for the actions taken. Thereof, even if the 
definition is clearly improved, it still holds several difficulties of application and serving its 
purpose to criminalise the acts of mercenarism. 
UN Convention does not provide a specific definition similar to the one that was invented in 
OAU Convention. Nevertheless, it refers to the offences committed, which can be interpreted 
as being with identical meaning to the crime of mercenarism as the aim of this convention is 
the same as of OAU Convention - to criminalise the acts of mercenarism. The conditions that 
are provided by UN Convention with regard to the offences committed by mercenaries as well 
as possible consequences and restrictions will be discussed further in the Chapter II. 
The most recent document that discusses the issue of private forces and this contains the 
definition of mercenaries is the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal 
Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and 
Security Companies During Armed Conflict (hereinafter referred to as Montreux Document).  
This document is not a legally binding international legal instrument. Nevertheless, it is a 
summary of good practices and obligations that apply to states with regard to private military 
forces operating in an armed conflict territory; and it determines the guidelines for correctly 
applying already existing international legal tools. The document intends to interpret and 
comment the existing legal norms to help states effectively carry out measures at national 
level with a purpose to be able to meet the requirements of international law that regulate the 
use of private forces.
15
 
                                                 
13
 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, New York, 4 
December 1989, A/RES/44/34, entered onto force 20 October 2001. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r034.htm. Accessed April 20, 2017. Article 1(1). 
14
 Op.cit. UN convention Article 1(2). 
15
 Federal Department of Foreign Affair FDFA of Switzerland. The Montreux Document. (2016). Available at: 
https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-
military-security-companies/montreux-document.html. Accessed: May 11, 2017. 
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These guidelines do not have their own legal formulation of mercenaries, but they are using 
already existing definition from Additional Protocol I discussed above.
16
 Therefore, the same 
issues arise when applying this definition as it cannot be used when examining majority of 
private forces used in the modern warfare. Also in Montreux Document it is underlined that it 
is extremely difficult to prove the motivation of private gain of the private forces as well as it 
is unrealistic to measure the material compensation that is paid to private contractors and 
official armed forces, thus the definition of mercenaries may rarely be used in order to 
examine the activities of mercenaries as most of modern private forces do not fall within this 
definition. 
17
 
From the above-mentioned information it can be seen that there are several international legal 
tools that define mercenaries. Furthermore, all of these international sources do not grant a 
combatant status to the fighters that conform with the definition of mercenary. Nevertheless, 
there are several issues when applying the definitions to the existing modern private forces. 
The definitions provided by the legal tools are too narrow and inflexible by setting several 
requirements that have to be fulfilled in order to be defined as a mercenary. As it can be seen, 
the most difficult criteria to fulfil  is the motivation of private gain requirement as well as 
burden of proof that the person has received or is promised to receive the material 
compensation for participation in the conflict. Accordingly, even if the definition of a 
mercenary is defined in several internationally or regionally applicable sources, the norms in 
this definition are frequently not applicable, thus are ineffective in the modern warfare. 
1.2. The non-existent definition of PMCs in the existing legal framework 
In previous subchapter the definition of mercenaries in the existing international legal sources 
was discussed. Nevertheless, in the modern conflict the private forces are much more diverse 
than just mercenaries. For instance, there are several private contractors and companies that 
operate as private forces in the armed conflict as well as outside the armed conflict zone. For 
instance, there can be a division made between private military companies (or contractors) 
and private security companies (or contractors). Originally they have different intentions and 
tasks, such as consulting, logistics and contractors that take active part in combat. Nowadays, 
frequently the duties and services provided by such contractors are overlapping, therefore, the 
division between them is not that strict and also the applicable legislation does not differ. 
Consequently, for the purpose of the thesis during this analysis mainly it will be referred to as 
private military and security contractors (PMCs) as a whole rather than dividing them 
according to the activities they conduct.  
Contrary to the definition of mercenaries, there are no direct definitions of PMCs in the 
existing legal framework. Nevertheless, in several occasions it can be interpreted as applying 
to the PMCs when examining the existing norms. For instance, in majority of the existing 
legal tools PMCs may be interpreted as falling under the definition either of a mercenary, a 
combatant or a civilian. Therefore, this subchapter will discuss how PMCs may fall under the 
definitions of mercenaries, combatants or civilians, not the definition of PMCs itself. As 
international legal tools provide different rules for each of those actors with regard to the 
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 Federal Department of Foreign Affair FDFA of Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross. The Montreux Document. (2009). Available at: 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf. Accessed: May 11, 2017. 
13 
 
possibility to be attacked, possibility to participate and influence others as well as possible 
consequences of prosecution, it is important to understand how one may fall within each of 
these definitions while acting as a PMC. 
As can be understood from above-mentioned a PMC may be considered as a mercenary if it 
fulfils all the criteria determined in the definitions of mercenary in the existing legal tools.  
For instance, the Hague Convention (V) does not refer explicitly to mercenaries but to “corps 
of combatants” or “recruiting agencies” of a neutral power that are introduced in order to 
assist to the belligerents.
18
 As no specific criteria is set, it can be interpreted that all private 
companies and groups of private fighters are prohibited. However, Hague Convention (V) 
does not mention the use of individual citizens as private forces, therefore, the use of 
individual private forces are legitimate and may be used according to the Hague Convention 
(V).
19
 Thus, according to the existing norms of Hague Convention (V), private force 
companies may fall under the definition of “corps of combatants”, but the ones that do not fall 
under this norm consequently may be considered as combatants or non-combatants (everyone 
that does not fall under the meaning of a combatant) according to the Article 1 of the Annex 
to the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War in Land (Hague Convention IV). 
Nevertheless, the term combatant has not been defined in this convention.
20
 
As mentioned in the first part of this chapter Geneva Conventions do not contain a definition 
of mercenaries. Nevertheless, the meanings of combatants and civilians are clearly explained, 
therefore, it can be argued under which definition PMCs may fall in different cases.  
Combatants are defined under Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(hereinafter referred to as Geneva Convention III), even if the Article 4 does not specifically 
set that it is a definition of a combatant. Nevertheless, from the Article 4 of Geneva 
Convention III it can be determined that the combatant is a following person: Whether 
components of armed forces or militias or volunteer corps, which are part of such armed 
forces that belong to the conflict party
21
; or 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those 
of organised resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating 
in or outside their own territory, even of this territory is occupied, provided that such 
militias or volunteer corps, including such organised resistance movements, fulfil the 
following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates ; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance;  
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war.
22
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According to the definition there are two options to be considered as a combatant - whether to 
be part of the official armed forces or meet the four requirements such as operating under the 
command of the governmental authority and carrying arms openly as well as wearing a 
distinctive sign and operate within the limits and norms of law of war.  
As Geneva Conventions do not prohibit the use of mercenaries or PMCs and does not even 
differentiate them form the rest of the fighters, there is no reason why PMCs could not fulfil 
the requirement of following the laws of war.  Moreover, if the PMCs are hired by the conflict 
party (in rare occasions possibly being included in the armed forces or operating together 
under one command and thus meeting the definition of paragraph 1)
23
 or by a party that have 
direct interests or connection with the conflict or party of the conflict, the PMCs could be able 
to act according to the instructions and command of a state authority, thus fulfilling also the 
first criteria. International legal tools do not determine what criteria have to be fulfilled to be 
included in the official armed forces of the state as it is a matter of internal laws and practices. 
Therefore, the occasions where PMCs are acting as a part of the official armed forces or 
together with armed forces are realistic, this also the definition of combatant may be applied 
on case by case basis. 
If the PMCs in question are operating under ones command with military involvement (thus 
carrying arms openly) in the conflict as well as wearing some distinctive signs that 
differentiate them from usual civilians, also the rest of criteria can be met. The distinctive 
signs are not defined or limited by law, thereof it can be interpreted that also one piece of 
clothes or any other element may be considered as a distinctive sign. Therefore, theoretically 
when interpreting this article there might be occasions were PMCs meet the requirements of 
the second paragraph of this article to be defined as combatants.  
The problem regarding the definition of PMCs as combatants (as well as civilians) is that it 
may be an internal matter how the PMCs are defined in relation to the official armed forces, 
whether as incorporated part or separate unity operating under the command of state authority 
of the involved party, is that the opposite side of the conflict may not be informed under 
which status the concrete state has defined them. Therefore, it is not clear, which of the 
criteria does or does not apply to the PMCs as the rights and protections differ depending on 
whether one is considered as a combatant or a civilian or other type such as unlawful 
combatant (which is not defined by law). Consequently, it is not clearly determined what 
activities may be conducted by the opposite side of the conflict if it is not clear who the 
involved actors of the conflict are. 
Furthermore, the PMCs that rather want to be separated from the state government as an 
individual corporation most likely would not fall under the definition of a combatant within 
the meaning of article 4 of Geneva Convention III. For those individual PMCs it would be 
almost impossible to prove that they are operating under the command of a state party, nor 
that they belong to the armed forces or even militias. The definition of a level of connection 
between a state party and PMCs frequently also depend on the level of responsibility the state 
party is willing to undertake for the actions taken by the PMCs. As an addition, the possibility 
of determining the same PMCs as mercenaries under different legal tool encumbers the 
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chances of applying the combatant definition to the PMCs, except where it is clear that PMCs 
belong to the party of the conflict.
24
  
Usually, when the PMCs are employed the contract between the contracting officer of the 
armed forces and private contractor company is made, thus possibly may determine the status, 
obligations, rights and rewards for PMCs. According to these contracts, most likely the 
commander is the private company that instructs its employees, not the armed forces or 
contracting officer as such. Therefore, it can be so that those PMCs do not fulfil the 
requirement of organised command from armed forces and state authority. The contracting 
officer usually is as a connector between the armed forces and PMCs, not the direct 
commander. Consequently in several occasions PMCs may not be considered as combatants 
due to the fact that they receive instructions from their employers, not armed forces. If the 
private company is considered as a whole, not as unity of employees, possibly it can be still 
interpreted as acting under the command of armed forces, thus fulfilling the requirements set 
out in Geneva Convention III to be defined as combatants.
25
 In addition, it has to be noted that 
the status of combatant may be possible only in the international armed conflict, not in the 
conflict with non-international character, thus leaving a place for armed forces or armed 
groups and civilians. 
According to Geneva Conventions, the PMCs that may not be defined as combatants may fall 
under the meaning of civilians or civilians who take direct part in the hostilities. According 
terms defined by Geneva Conventions there are only two main actors in the armed conflict - 
combatants and civilians, consequently, PMCs that do not qualify to be combatants are 
civilians. Unfortunately, the problem arises with a fact that civilians are not allowed to 
participate in hostilities and may be punished for participation. In addition, civilians may not 
be attacked, therefore, according to this definition, PMCs that do not fall within the definition 
of combatants may not be attacked, unless they are directly participating in hostilities. What is 
more, Geneva Conventions are not clear on setting requirements that precisely define a direct 
participation in hostilities.
26
 Therefore, there is a possibility that PMCs might be considered 
also as non-combatants. Meaning that under non-combatant status may fall not only civilians, 
but also military actors that do not fall within the definition of combatants.
27
 
Moreover, the problem arise that defining PMCs as civilians does not meet all types of PMCs, 
which would have to be taken into account when determining their status. For instance, PMCs 
may directly participate in the combat, meaning that they can be considered either as 
combatants or civilians that are directly participating in hostilities. PMCs may also have roles 
of a bodyguard, support or supplying necessary accessories to the armed forces. Support or 
logistics activities should not necessarily mean the direct participation in hostilities. 
Moreover, if PMCs are acting as bodyguards not in the territory of military activities, they 
should not be considered as directly participating in hostilities. However, if this territory 
would at some point become a military objective, the PMC that would act as a bodyguard 
would automatically become the civilian that is participating in hostilities, which would mean 
that he becomes an unlawful actor that may be punished for being present.
28
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Accordingly, in some occasions, PMCs may meet the requirements determined in the Geneva 
Convention III in article 4(4), which determines that any person that is not a member of the 
armed forces but accompanies them 
such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply 
contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the 
armed forces
29
 
and has received the authorisation as well as identity card from the person they accompany 
may be considered as a non-combatant - civilian who accompanies the armed forces. 
Therefore, may be entitled to several protections that also combatants receive, assuming that 
those PMCs do participate only as support to armed forces, and do not participate in a 
combat.
30
 
According to Additional Protocols of 1977 of Geneva Conventions the definition of PMCs as 
such has not been included, Nevertheless, Additional Protocol I determines three statuses 
under which one could be considered - mercenaries, combatants and civilians. 
As discussed in the first subchapter, in order for the private force to be defined as a 
mercenary, certain criteria have to be fulfilled simultaneously. As modern private forces 
rarely may be defined as mercenaries, according to Additional Protocol I they may be 
determined either as combatants or non-combatants (civilians or assistance forces to the 
official armed forces that do not have combatant status). 
The combatant status in Additional Protocol I is determined under the Article 43, which states 
that combatants are the armed forces that belong to one of the conflict parties, whether official 
organised armed forces or other groups or units, assuming that they are operating under the 
command of that party. Therefore, it can be interpreted, that if PMCs are operating under the 
command of a conflict party, they can be considered combatants.
31
 Consequently, the 
definition anticipated the same requirements as Geneva Convention III, thus also 
incorporating the same issues regarding definition of PMCs as combatants, discussed above 
regarding the question of command under which PMCs are operating.  
Additional Protocol I has not changed definitions regarding combatants and civilians, 
therefore, the same as in Geneva Convention III, the fighters that do not fulfil criteria of a 
combatant, are civilians or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities. Exceptions are PMCs 
that fall under the definition of mercenaries according to Article 47 of the Additional Protocol 
I, thus automatically are potentially punishable. Consequently, as definitions and conditions 
for civilians are similar in Geneva Convention III and Additional Protocol I, it can be 
concluded that also the issues and challenges when defining the PMCs as civilians are similar.  
The only essential difference is that Commentaries of Additional Protocol I has defined the 
meaning   of direct participation in hostilities. Meaning that in order to determine that one has 
directly participated in hostilities it has to be proved that there exists a causal link between the 
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activity that was carried out and the harm done to the opposite side in the same time and place 
where the activity took place.
32
 
In addition, the same as for Geneva Conventions, combatant status may be applicable only in 
international armed conflict, while in non-international armed conflict the PMCs may be 
defined only as armed groups and civilians. 
The OAU Convention and UN Convention do not provide any other definitions than the 
definition of mercenary as the purpose of these conventions was to prohibit and criminalise 
the use of such private forces as mercenaries. Accordingly, those Conventions do not 
distinguish between the mercenaries and other private forces, therefore, it can be applicable 
only to those fighters that fall within the mercenary definitions discussed in the first 
subchapter. For private forces that do not fall within the definition of mercenary according to 
the OAU Convention and UN Convention, these international legal tools are not applicable at 
all. 
Accordingly, there are several occasions where PMCs might be considered as combatants or 
civilians, however, the definition will depend on several aspects. For example, whether the 
PMCs fall within the requirements of the definition of combatants according to Geneva 
Convention III or Additional protocol I. What is more, it has to be kept in mind that the 
definition of PMCs may depend also on the state authority and internal legislation as states 
may be held liable at some level for the actions taken by PMCs. In addition, the issue of 
determining PMCs as combatants or civilians is that there is a possibility that the same PMCs 
may be defined as mercenaries, if they fall within the requirements of a mercenary under a 
different legal tool; exception is when PMCs are always hired by the party of the conflict, 
thus may not fulfil the requirements of being a mercenary. Several questions arise whether the 
terms “unlawful combatants” or “quasi combatants” might be used when defining PMCs 
under existing international legal framework, nevertheless, such definitions are not clearly 
established either. Consequently, the definition of PMCs has to be decided on case by case 
basis where all the facts and conditions have to be taken into account.  
The newest legal tool Montreux document that provides legal guidelines based on the existing 
law and practice has determined the definition of PMCs quite clearly and applicable to the 
modern private forces that are operating nowadays. Unfortunately, this document is not 
binding and it has no legal force, therefore, it can be used as an example, but there are no 
obligations imposed to the member states to follow these guidelines. Nevertheless, the 
definition of PMCs is defined in paragraph 9 of Preface, which states that PMCs are: 
are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective 
of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, 
armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and 
other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and 
advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.
33
 
In addition the Montreux document also explains the meaning of the PMCs’ personnel in 
order to avoid any confusion while determining that any person that is in any way employed 
by the PMCs is considered to be a PMCs’ personnel. It does not distinguish between simple 
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employees or commanders and managers, all persons that are employed by PMCs are their 
personnel, therefore, equal rules apply to all.
34
 
The Montreux document is the only legal tool that has developed a modern definition of 
PMCs that can be applied in the warfare conflicts today. It does not determine the 
requirements of motivation of compensation measures, neither has it distinguished from 
which nationality or state one can or cannot be in order to be defined as a mercenary, 
combatant or other. The main requirement is to be an employ if a business entity, which can 
be applied to most of the PMCs in the modern warfare. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, 
this document is not legally binding and can be used only as an example and guideline, but it 
does not imply any obligation to any of the parties. 
 
From the information discussed above it is clear that there are several international legal tools 
that are defining the meanings of mercenaries and private military forces. However, all 
existing legal tools have shortcomings when defining modern private forces, therefore, 
frequently the norms may not be applicable, thus precluding the accountability issues of 
mercenaries and PMCs as no concrete legal framework is applicable in each case as lot has 
been left for interpretation on case by case basis. The most sufficient definition is provided in 
the Montreux document, nevertheless, it is not binding to any of the member states and can be 
used only as an example. 
Nevertheless, the main differences between mercenaries and PMCs are follows: Mercenaries 
are usually groups of soldiers that are invented for the concrete conflict or activity for gaining 
and individual profit while PMCs are permanent business organisations that operate in order 
to gain the profit for business. As mercenaries are usually employed in certain conflicts, 
PMCs may be employed to any territory, any activity that is being determined by the contract 
between the company and contracting officer of the armed forces. Moreover, PMCs do 
provide broader range of services, whether military, supply, assistance, logistics and others, 
while mercenaries were used mainly for combat.
35
 
As in this chapter it was discussed how mercenaries and PMCs are defined under existing 
legal framework, the next chapter will analyse the role of existing tools when governing the 
activities of modern private forces and what problems may arise. 
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CHAPTER II THE ROLE OF EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK WHEN 
GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF MERCENARIES AND 
PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS  
As discussed in the first chapter there are various international legal tools that are applicable 
to mercenaries and PMCs. Even though the sources have developed from different 
chronological times and events, all legal documents lack several important aspects that are 
necessary to sufficiently regulate the use of mercenaries and PMCs in the modern warfare. 
For instance, the difficulty of adequately defining the mercenaries and PMCs according to the 
existing norms as discussed previously precludes the possibility of correctly applying the law 
to the private forces and involved parties.  
This chapter will discuss the role of these international legal tools when governing the 
activities of mercenaries and PMCs while discussing the problems of the status of private 
forces and what are they entitled to, the possibility of criminalisation of their activities and 
existence of punishment under these legal tools.  Furthermore, the bindingness of such tools 
will be discussed and possible problems that may arise when applying such rules will be 
analysed. As well as analysis of the control, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in each 
of the legal tools. The same as in the first chapter the following legal tools will be analysed: 
Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols, OAU Convention, UN 
Convention and Montreux Document. 
2.1. Hague Conventions 
As stated in the previous chapter, the Hague Conventions were one of the first legal 
documents that regulates the activities of private forces even if the precise definition of 
mercenaries and PMCs is not determined. Furthermore, Hague Convention seeks to limit the 
use of private force groups, but fails to regulate the individual private forces that engage 
themselves in the armed conflict.  
As discussed in the Chapter I the private forces are mainly governed by the Hague 
Convention V, which regulates the activities of Neutral Powers. Hague Convention IV could 
be applicable only in those cases where the private forces, either mercenaries or PMCs would 
be nationals or residents of the conflict parties, not from the neutral state. Moreover, in such a 
case, the private forces would have to fall within the definition of belligerent combatants or 
non-combatants.  
Similarly, as in Geneva Conventions and Additional protocols, not only armed forces as such 
would be entitled to the combatant status, but also militias and volunteers that fulfil the 
requirements of command, having distinctive emblem, carrying arms openly and operate in 
accordance with laws of war.
36
 Nevertheless, as discussed above, not all PMCs conduct the 
activities of carrying arms openly as their work duties frequently include only logistical 
support and other assistance that does not include the participation in combat. Mercenaries 
and PMC employees that fall within the definition of a combatant or non-combatant would be 
entitled to the Prisoner of war status according to the Article 3 of Hague Convention IV.  
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Nevertheless, if a mercenary or PMC employee are conducting duties that are ordered by the 
belligerent commander, thus acting as a part of the conflict party, may be granted a prisoner 
of war status only if he holds the certificate from authorities of this conflict party.
37
 
In case where the mercenaries or PMC employees fall within the definitions of a combatant or 
non-combatant belonging to the belligerent party, the State is responsible for all their 
activities and possible violations according to Article 3 of Hague Convention IV. Therefore, 
might be liable to pay the compensation if the case requires it.  
According to Hague Convention V the groups of mercenaries or PMCs may not be opened in 
the territory of a neutral state as determined by Article 4. However, the groups of mercenaries 
or PMCs that are created within the territory of a conflict party do not fall within this 
Convention and may be subject to the Hague Convention IV, if they fall within the definitions 
of combatants or non-combatants.  
Moreover, also individuals from neutral parties are not governed at all, meaning that the 
activities taken by individual mercenaries would be allowed. According to Articles 6 and 7 of 
the Hague Convention V the neutral state is not responsible in any way of the following 
activities taken by an individual: if the person individually crosses the border to provide 
services to belligerents
38
 or if he acts as an exporter or transporter of arms, munitions and 
other necessary goods for the armed conflict.
39
 
Therefore, Hague Convention V does not allow the activities of forming the groups of 
mercenaries and PMCs while implying the direct responsibility of this neutral state. But acts 
of individual mercenaries and PMC employees are not forbidden according to this 
convention, therefore, it is not applicable in case of examining the activities of individual 
private forces.  
Nevertheless, the act of forming mercenary groups or PMC employees is not allowed under 
the Hague Convention V and Article 5 of this Conventions implies the direct responsibility of 
this neutral state to ensure that activities determined in Article 4 of forming groups of private 
forces do not take place on their territory. But states are not responsible for any other 
violations that take place outside its territory.  
For the rest of the activities that are not of a neutral party, the Hague Convention IV might be 
applicable if private forces fall within the definition of combatants or non-combatants. 
Nevertheless, there are still several issues arising when determining the status of mercenaries 
and PMCs in a way so that the Hague Convention IV would apply and there are no guidelines 
on how to determine the rightful status of these private forces, nor there are any monitoring or 
enforcement mechanisms established in the Hague Conventions that would explicitly 
determine how the activities of mercenaries and PMCs could be controlled.  
2.2. Geneva Conventions 
Chronologically the next legal tools that were established in order to govern the armed 
conflicts were all four Geneva Conventions. As to the regulation of mercenaries and PMCs 
there are no specific definitions and requirements covered by the Geneva Conventions. 
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Nevertheless, the closest norms in order to regulate the activities of mercenaries and PMCs 
are laid out in the Geneva Convention III as discussed in the Chapter I and Convention (IV) 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereinafter referred to as 
Geneva Convention IV) as according to the Geneva Conventions persons participating in the 
armed conflict may be either combatants or civilians. In addition also the non-combatant 
status may be applied in some cases. 
It has to be noted that Geneva Conventions are ratified by 194 states, therefore, gaining a 
status of universally applicable legal tool, thus being one of the most efficient documents 
regulating the activities during the armed conflict.
40
 Accordingly, this includes also the 
regulation of the activities of mercenaries and PMCs even if the Conventions lack the 
definition and norms that could be sufficiently applicable. Unfortunately, due to the lack of 
ratification of majority of the rest of the international legal tools, Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols as a customary law are the main documents regulating the armed 
conflict, including activities of the modern private forces. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, as Geneva Conventions do not have a specific 
definition for any private forces, nor mercenaries, nor PMCs, there are two possibilities - 
define private forces as combatants, or define them as civilians. There have been discussion 
whether to consider private forces as unlawful combatants similarly as terrorists, but it arises 
several issues due to the fact that terrorists as unlawful combatants are deprived of any special 
treatment or rules. Unlawful combatants do not deserve any protections that are provided by 
the Geneva Conventions. But as mercenaries and PMCs frequently are conducting the same 
activities as armed forces or personnel that works in accordance with armed forces, it does not 
seem to be adequate to deprive them form all the protections and advantages. Therefore, 
definition of unlawful combatants does not sufficiently address the mercenaries and PMCs, 
accordingly, possibility of applying norms of combatants or civilians are usually used. 
When applying the Geneva Conventions it is important to distinguish the status of a person as 
different conditions apply. For instance, for private forces that would be defined as 
combatants, the prisoner of war status would be granted according to the Article 4 of Geneva 
Convention III.
41
 However, in order to be defined as a combatant one should fulfil all the 
criteria sent in the Article 4(2) as analysed previously. Due to the specific requirements it 
would be only in rare cases when private forces would be referred to as legal combatants. 
Therefore, it would be difficult to entitle them with all the privileges and protections that are 
ensured to the combatants with prisoner of war status. For instance, prisoners of war have to 
be treated humanely, if captured. No torture, medical experiments or violent treatment is 
allowed according to Article 13 of Geneva Convention III.
42
 Furthermore, prisoners of war 
have to be respected, they have several freedoms to own their property, to exercise their 
religion. They are entitled to the medical treatment, if necessary according to Article 15 of the 
Geneva Convention III.
43
  
Also mercenaries and PMCs that fall under the definition of civilians accompanying armed 
forces are entitled to the prisoner of wars status, therefore, deserve the same protections as for 
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combatants in terms of human treatment, respect and prohibition of violence, medical 
treatment and torture. However, unlike combatants, civilians may be punished for the criminal 
actions taken. Therefore, in case a mercenary or PMC that would be considered as civilian 
that is accompanying armed forces and would be involved in the self-defence situation during 
the military activity, they could be tried in court according to criminal laws and possibly be 
charged with murder and other crimes, which can be punished with imprisonment and death 
penalty in some states. 
For the persons that are defined as combatants, they are protected with regard to 
criminalisation of the acts taken during the armed conflict. Meaning, that combatants may not 
be held criminally liable for actions taken during the combat, if they have been required in the 
course of the conflict. Combatants may be prosecuted only in courts that are applicable to 
warriors according to national law and can be tried only for crimes that are in violation of 
laws of war. In addition, all combatants have a right to fair trial and adequate representation 
for protection.
44
 All combatants have a right to a privilege that relieves them from the 
criminal responsibility if the acts taken have been in accordance with laws of war. For 
example, a combatant may not be held criminally liable for killing other armed forces during 
the combat. Consequently, without this privilege one can be held criminally responsible and 
prosecuted for murder or other crimes.
45
 
Accordingly, the mercenaries and PMCs that may be considered as combatants would be able 
to take part in a combat without the anxiety of being criminally responsible for his work 
duties while the mercenaries and PMCs that do not fall within the definition of combatant and 
are just civilians or civilians accompanying armed forces can be criminally punished. 
Therefore, mercenaries and PMCs may conduct only such activities that do not require them 
to directly participate in the conduct and do not require also the necessity for defence as it 
could lead for criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, also the mercenaries and PMCs that are 
considered to be civilians accompanying armed forces deserve the protection and insurance of 
human treatment, respect and prohibition pf torture etc. 
The rest of the mercenaries that do not meet the requirements of combatants or accompanying 
persons may be considered as civilians or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, 
depending on the activities that they are entitled to do. Civilians the same as combatants are 
entitled to fair trial, nevertheless, they can be prosecuted for all acts that constitute a crime 
under national and international laws, including murder in case of a death of another person 
during the combat. Therefore, mercenaries and PMCs may be prosecuted for their duties as 
employees if they do not fall within the definition of combatant under the Geneva 
Conventions. This is an issue due to the reason that the same acts that are conducted by armed 
forces would be considered as war duties while the same acts conducted by mercenaries and 
PMCs would be defined as criminal acts that require punishment. In addition, also the act 
itself of civilian taking a direct part in hostilities may be punished by criminal law. 
The main problems apart from the lack of adequate definition that could be applied to the 
mercenaries and PMCs is that Geneva Conventions do not include any of the monitoring or 
control mechanisms that are necessary in order to regulate the activities of private forces. 
There is no institutional body that specifically monitors the actions and enforces norms and 
ensures the consequences for the violations of law. The monitoring, control and enforcement 
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is left for the individual states to carry through according to their own initiative. Therefore, 
the sufficient application of norms of Geneva Conventions frequently depends on the 
goodwill of the state as there are no institutionalised enforcement and not enough 
consequences and punishment for not obeying the norms laid out in Geneva Conventions. In 
addition, it has to be emphasised that Geneva Conventions regulate only the activities that are 
taking place only during the international armed conflict, thus leaving the activities of 
mercenaries and PMCs completely unmonitored and unregulated during the non-international 
armed conflicts. Nevertheless, the modern warfare where also private forces are used 
frequently are with non-international armed conflict nature, therefore, a regulatory 
international framework is necessary in order to control the activities of mercenaries and 
PMCs and held private forces or states accountable for the possible violations. 
2.3. Additional Protocols 
In addition to Geneva Conventions of 1949 the Additional Protocols were established in order 
to complement the laws of war according to new developments. Additional Protocol II was 
the first legal tool that was established to examine the activities conducted during the non-
international conflicts. In addition, unlike the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol 
included the definition of a mercenary as private forces were used frequently and new 
regulation was necessary. Nevertheless, the mercenary definition is applicable only during the 
armed conflict according to Additional Protocol I.  
Additional Protocol I has been ratified by 174 states
46
 while Additional Protocol II has been 
ratified by 168 states
47
. Unfortunately, there are several states including the United States that 
has not ratified either of the Additional Protocols. Even if there are some articles, for example 
Article 47 of Additional Protocol I that defines mercenaries that are universally applicable as 
customary law, there are several norms that are applicable only to the parties that have ratified 
the Protocols. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Additional Protocol I has the following division under 
which private forces may be defined. Firstly, private forces may be considered as 
mercenaries, if fulfil the criteria according to Article 47 of the Additional Protocol I.
48
 As 
discussed in the first chapter the criteria for being a mercenary are rarely met as they are 
inflexible and very specific. Nevertheless, the activities of mercenaries are prohibited under 
Article 47, hence, they are not criminalised There are no control or monitoring mechanisms 
with regard to the use of mercenaries. The only consequence of being a mercenary is that 
there is no possibility of being awarded a prisoner of war status, thus not being entitled to any 
privileges or protections. However, human treatment and prohibition of torture is applicable 
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to all persons, whether mercenaries, civilians or combatants. As a consequence, mercenaries 
may be held liable according to national criminal laws, if captured.  
Private forces may be considered as combatants if they fulfil the criteria set in the Articles 43 
and are entitled to the prisoner of war status under Article 44.
49
 Additional Protocol I expands 
the definition of combatants by limiting the requirements that have to be fulfilled, therefore, 
according to Additional Protocol I the private forces may be considered as combatants if they 
are groups or units of persons that are acting under the command of conflict party.
50
 The same 
as in Geneva Conventions, combatants are allowed to take direct part in hostilities and have 
right to privileges and protective treatment. They may not be held criminally liable for the 
actions committed during the combat, except of actions that are violating the norms of laws of 
war, such as committing crimes against humanity, genocide and others. 
The private forces that do not fall under the definitions either of mercenary or combatant have 
to be considered as civilians. The same as under Geneva Conventions, the civilians are 
protected and may not be attacked unless they are taking part in hostilities. In such a case, 
private forces that are defined as civilians may be punished not only for the criminal acts of 
committing a murder, but also for the fact itself of taking a direct part in hostilities.  
According to Additional Protocol II, there are no division of mercenaries and combatants - the 
only division is between armed forces and civilians. Additional Protocol II is applicable to all 
conflicts that do not fall within the definition of armed conflict, meaning that it can apply to 
such internal conflicts as “riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a 
similar nature as not being armed conflicts.”51 All persons, if captured, may be tried for 
criminal activities taken and for participation in hostilities.  
Both Additional Protocols the same as Geneva Conventions are one of the most sufficient 
international legal tools for governing the activities or private forces due to the fact that it is 
one of the most ratified legal frameworks that regulate the activities during conflicts - whether 
international or non-international. Nevertheless, also Additional Protocols lack adequate 
definition or mercenaries as it is too precise and inflexible for modern forces and definition of 
PMCs is non-existent at all. Moreover, as well for Additional Protocols, there are no 
monitoring and control mechanisms of regulating activities of private forces. And as there are 
no institutionalised enforcement methods, it relies on the states themselves to regulate the 
activities of modern private forces. Therefore, in majority of cases the activities of 
mercenaries and PMCs are completely unregulated and impossible to punish as no concrete 
legal guidelines that are binding are established. 
2.4. OAU Convention 
As discussed earlier OAU Convention not only defines mercenaries, but also determines what 
the crime of mercenarism is,
52
 thus being one of the first legal tools criminalising the use of 
mercenaries in the armed conflict. Unfortunately, it is not a convention of universal 
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application as it has been ratified only by 32 states and thus apply only if a state is a party to 
the convention.
53
  
Even though the OAU Convention has defined the acts that have to be criminalised, it fails to 
adequately address the definition of mercenaries due to the fact that it is very specific and 
unrealistic when applying to the modern private forces as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Moreover, it does not address the PMCs at all, therefore, this convention is mostly 
inapplicable to modern private forces as only in rare occasions one falls within the 
requirements of a mercenary. 
According to Article 3 of OAU Convention any person that commits a crime of mercenarism 
commits an offence and it shall be punished. Nevertheless, it is limited to the crime that is 
committed in Africa, which makes this convention inapplicable to the conflicts where African 
state is not a party to.
54
 However, there are no direct punishment conditions determined in the 
OAU Convention, therefore, it again is left for the individual states to decide on the 
appropriate punishment for the actions taken. Article 4 of the convention determines that a 
person that can be determined as a mercenary shall be responsible for everything, such as 
crime of mercenarism as such and all other offences committed that might be used as a basis 
for prosecution.
55
 
The OAU Convention is the first convention that has established also the responsibility of a 
state with regard to the use of mercenaries. As well as determined obligations of a state to 
forbid the use of mercenaries, whether to hire or allow the activities of mercenaries on their 
territory. As well as obliges states to provide any information with regard to the use of private 
forces by any of the conflict parties.
56
 
In addition to the obligations the parties of the OAU Convention are required to punish all the 
activities related to mercenaries and crimes of mercenarism “by the severest penalties under 
its laws including capital punishment.”57 
Even though the norms determined in OAU Convention are developed in terms of the 
punishment of the mercenaries, it has to be noted that the Convention does not include the 
definition of PMCs. And as the definition of mercenaries is so inflexible, it makes this 
convention almost inapplicable to modern private forces. Moreover, it covers only 
mercenaries as individuals and does not include the corporate criminal responsibility, which 
would have to be applied in majority of PMC cases.
58
 Consequently, the OAU Convention 
may be applicable only to the cases where African states are involved and only with regard to 
private forces that fall within the definition of mercenaries according to Article 1 of this 
convention. 
2.5. UN Convention 
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One of the most recent development with regard to mercenaries is the UN Convention. 
Contrary to the OAU Convention it was not established for any specific territory or states and 
was intended for universal use. In addition, it is applicable to both - either international or 
non-international armed conflicts.  
Unfortunately, the same as for OAU Convention it has barely been used as there are only 35 
states that have ratified this convention.
59
 Moreover, it has to be taken into account that the 
main states that are using the services of modern private forces like PMCs are not parties to 
this convention. Furthermore, also none of the permanent members of the Security Council of 
the United Nations are members to this convention, which sets a negative example to the rest 
of the United Nations member states. For example, the main PMC users that are not parties to 
this Convention are: United States, United Kingdom, “Canada, Colombia, Denmark, El 
Salvador, Israel [and] South Africa”60. 
Consequently, the problems arise due to the fact that one of the legal tools that could most 
adequately address the issues of private modern forces may not be applicable in majority of 
cases, therefore, it is not sufficient for regulating the use of PMCs and mercenaries. 
Apart from the lack of ratification of UN Convention it can be seen that the definition of 
mercenaries has developed significantly, nevertheless, it still may not be applicable to most of 
the modern private forces as discussed during the first chapter. 
Nevertheless, UN Convention has developed several conditions that results offence and shall 
be punished. For instance, “[a]ny person who recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenaries, 
(…) commits an offence” according to Article 2 of this convention.61 In addition, also any 
mercenary that takes direct part in hostilities commits an offence even if not committing any 
actual crime according to the Article 3 of this Convention. 
According to the Article 5, all activities concerning the mercenaries, whether use, recruitment 
of financing are prohibited and all activities with regard to mercenaries shall be punishable.  
According to Article 9 of the UN Convention a state, which is a party of this convention has 
to take all necessary steps to ensure that national jurisdiction is established in order to be able 
to deal with any of the offences that are committed either in its territory or on boards of its 
aircrafts or ships; or offences that are committed by its nationals.
62
 In addition, state also has 
to establish the jurisdiction that can deal with offences determined by Articles 2 and 3. What 
is more, UN Convention does not only set the obligations to establish jurisdiction over the 
offences determined by this convention, but also allows to use any criminal jurisdiction that is 
in accordance with national law of that state as determined by Article 9(3). What makes the 
content of this convention more effective is that any punishments are aimed not only to the 
persons who directly attempt or commit these offences, but also persons who accompany 
these offenders.
63
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When analysing the role of UN Convention in governing the activities of modern private 
forces it can be concluded that from the content point of view it has been a big step forward to 
attaining the sufficient legal tool. Moreover, it contains also possibility to punish the activities 
of mercenaries and PMCs as well as puts obligation to states to establish the relevant 
jurisdiction to carry out the conditions determined by the convention. However, it still 
contains the definition that is almost unrealistic to apply to modern private forces that are 
used today. Even though the UN Convention was intended to be as a universally applicable 
tool the lack of ratification of it and the bad example that is set by the permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council has resulted for this Convention to be almost irrelevant 
in majority of the conflicts of today.  
2.6. Montreux document 
As discussed in the first chapter the Montreux document does not imply any obligations to 
states as it is not a legally binding document. Furthermore, the existence of this document 
does not affect any of the obligations that states already have under other international legal 
documents. Nevertheless, it has a role when dealing with modern private forces as it can be 
used as guidelines at least for appropriate application of already existing law. Moreover, it is 
the only document that provides information or definition not only to mercenaries, but also to 
PMCs, which makes it more flexible to apply the law. Montreux document is aimed at states 
and international organisations and is well supported from states and international 
organisations from different regions of the world, therefore, it is not limited to the use only in 
one region as was OAU Convention. Currently there are 54 states that are members to this 
document and three international organisations such as European Union, Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe and North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as the 
document is meant for it to be supported by any states and organisations worldwide.
64
 
Montreux document is an assisting tool to states while summarising the existing laws and 
practices that could be used by states as an example for what should be implemented and 
applied to their national laws and activities. But it has to be taken into account that Montreux 
document does not imply any obligations and mostly relies only on the existing international 
conventions, such as humanitarian law and human rights law. Consequently, even if the 
Montreux document could be considered as a helpful tool, it still follows the same practices 
and laws that were found problematic in the chapters above. Therefore, the Montreux 
document could be used in cases where there exists a conflict in the interpretation of existing 
laws, but does not fully accomplish the step forward to be as a solution for insufficiencies in 
these laws.  
For instance, the document relies on Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols and 
International Human Rights law norms. Therefore, even the document does include its own 
definition of PMCs, it is not legally binding, therefore, if disputed, enforceable may be only 
the same definition of mercenaries as of Additional Protocol I. Consequently, there exist 
identical problems of application of this definition to modern private forces as the burden of 
proof for motivation and compensation of these private forces may not be reached. But it has 
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to be taken into account that PMCs rarely fall into the definitions of combatants, thus are 
mainly are treated as civilians, which may be prosecuted under certain circumstances.  
On the other hand, Montreux document does provide the definition of PMCs, which would 
most likely be applicable to the majority to the modern private forces nowadays. 
Unfortunately, the existence of this definition does not solve the issues of criminalisation of 
their activities and the responsibility of a state, individual or corporate responsibility under 
international law when it comes to evaluating the violations of laws when private forces act or 
are used by states.  
Nevertheless, the Montreux document has gathered several good practices that could be used 
by states and PMCs in order to implement their national laws in a way so that these issues and 
violations could be properly addressed. The Montreux document has made the following 
division in order to explain the possible actions for successful governance of PMC activities:  
c) “Contracting States” are States that directly contract for the services of PMSCs, 
including, as appropriate,  where such a PMSC subcontracts with another 
PMSC. 
d) “Territorial States” are States on whose territory PMSCs operate. 
e) “Home States” are States of nationality of a PMSC, i.e. where a PMSC is registered 
or incorporated; if the State where the PMSC is incorporated is not the one where it 
has its principal place of management, then the State where the PMSC has its principal 
place of management is the “Home State”.65 
 
Further detailed analysis of theses good practices will be discussed in the forthcoming chapter 
while discussing each of the actors separately.  
Accordingly, it can be determined that Montreux document is an excellent tool for developing 
the necessary laws for the governance of the activities of modern private forces. 
Unfortunately, as it is not binding, none of the ideas summarised in the document may be 
enforced.  
 
There are several international legal acts that take part in governing the activities of 
mercenaries and PMCs as analysed in this chapter. In addition to the legal tools mentioned 
above, also norms of international human rights law have to be applied when regulating the 
activities of modern private forces. As human rights issues are universally applicable 
independently of the existence of armed conflicts, the specific legal norms will not be 
discussed in detail in this thesis. Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that several 
problems arise when applying the existing international legal norms to the issues related to 
mercenaries and PMCs. For instance, the insufficient definition of mercenaries due to its 
inapplicability and non-existent definition of PMCs in any of the binding legal instruments. 
As well as territorial limitations or lack of ratification of the existing international laws that 
govern the acts of modern private forces.  
Consequently, it can be seen that even though there are several international conventions 
applicable in cases of use of mercenaries and PMCs, there are several shortcomings of these 
legal documents and thus they do not sufficiently regulate the modern private forces that are 
acting in conflicts today. In the further chapter the responsibility of different actors such as 
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states, international organisations as well as individual and corporate responsibility will be 
discussed in order to understand the role of each of these actors in governing the activities of 
modern private forces and determine what are the possible insufficiencies in existing legal 
norms.  
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CHAPTER III STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY WITH REGARD TO MERCENARIES AND 
PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS 
In previous chapters the meaning of mercenaries and PMCs were discussed as well as the role 
of existing international legal tools in dealing with the use of modern private forces 
nowadays. It can be seen that there have been established several international legal tools that 
take part in governing the activities of private modern forces. However, several problems and 
insufficiencies arise when applying the existing legal framework. For instance, the existence 
of binding sufficient definitions of mercenaries and PMCs as well as concrete monitoring 
mechanisms and accountability issue’ instructions that could be implemented and used by all 
involved parties. Therefore, it is important to understand what is the role of states, 
international organisations, PMCs (as corporate entities) and individuals when governing the 
activities of mercenaries and PMCs. Accordingly, this chapter will discuss the responsibility 
of states and international organisations as well as individual and corporate responsibility with 
regard to mercenaries and PMCs in order to make conclusions about insufficiencies in the 
existing legal framework.  
3.1. Responsibility of states when governing the activities of mercenaries 
and private military contractors 
First of all, state responsibility is regulated by virtue by the Articles of Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (herewith and after below referred to as ARS). 
Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that it follows from regulation of the previously 
discussed international humanitarian law tools, the use of mercenaries is not allowed in 
humanitarian law. But only some of the tools are directed at criminalisation of their activities. 
Consequently, this chapter will mostly focus on the responsibility of states that arise with the 
use of different PMCs, which are not prohibited under international law. Nevertheless, even 
those PMCs that could be considered as falling under the definition of mercenaries would 
imply similar responsibility to states.  
As determined by the Article 1 of ARS any state that breaches international law is entitled to 
being held responsible. Moreover, as further described in the Commentaries of Draft ARS, 
breach of an international law is “wrongful act of a State [that] may consist in one or more 
actions or omissions or a combination of both”.66 Consequently, it has to be understood that 
not only the direct actions that violate international law are subject to responsibility, but also a 
failure to act may constitute a wrongful act. The omission may constitute a violation in 
circumstances where a state knowingly decided not to react to the breach of international law 
even if there were no obstacles but it was required by law.  
For example, if the state in questions would be aware of breaches of international law 
committed by PMCs they would be obliged to take all necessary measures to terminate such 
activities, independently on whether it is the state that hired these employees or the state in 
which territory the breaches took place. The state that was aware of these breaches is obliged 
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to act, therefore, a failure to act would constitute a wrongful act for which it could be held 
accountable. The sequence of obligation to act of different states involved will be discussed 
further in this chapter.  
Furthermore, ARS also contain articles that might be directly applicable to the activities of 
modern private forces. For instance, Article 4 of ARS determines that any act of state organ 
must be considered as an act of that state. Thus, if PMCs would be incorporated into armed 
forces of that state, also all activities of PMCs would have to be considered as state activities, 
for which state may be held responsible. For the purpose of the clarification of that article it 
also determines that with a state organ one should understand “any person or entity which has 
that status in accordance with the internal law”67. Consequently, it is up to that state and its 
national law, which institutions or persons are to be considered as state organs, independently 
on what activities they are responsible for.  
Furthermore, Article 5 of the ARS applies to the private forces, whether as individuals or 
groups, that are acting in a way that exercise governmental authority. This article determines 
that such activities exercised due to governmental authority are to be considered as acts of 
state. For example, these could be private entities that exercise governmental authority that is 
determined by the national law of that state. Therefore, these entities may act independently, 
but if by virtue of national law it is determined that this entity may exercise the governmental 
authority, the state may be held accountable for any violations committed due to this 
activity.
68
 
In addition to the entities that exercise governmental authority, states may be held accountable 
also for the international law breaches that are committed by entities which are acting directly 
under the state control. As Article 8 of ARS determines, PMCs, either individual employees 
or PMC company as a whole, that act “on the instructions of, or under the direction or control 
of” 69  the state, are committing an act of that state. Therefore, this state may be held 
accountable for any violations and breaches of international law.  
There has to be a clear division made between those two articles and PMC activities. For 
instance, under article 5 of ARS PMCs are acting as private institutions that exercise 
governmental authority under national law of that state, therefore, PMCs do not have to 
receive any orders from the state. Any activity that will fall under the national law 
requirements that determine which governmental authority that PMC is carrying out will be a 
state responsibility without any specific orders. On the contrary, under article 8 of ARS in 
order for the state to be directly responsible for the actions taken by that PMC or its 
employees the state has to give direct orders to that PMC or its employees or they have to be 
acting under the direct control of that state.  
Consequently, states may be directly held accountable for actions taken by modern private 
forces if the conditions of Articles 5 and 8 of ARS are fulfilled, meaning that either the PMCs 
are entitled to exercise governmental authority or are acting directly under the control and 
directions of that state. Or states may indirectly be held accountable for breaches and 
violations of PMCs and their employees if that state was aware of these violations but did not 
do all in their power to terminate such activities.  
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Nevertheless, with regard to the use of private modern forces states are mainly responsible for 
ensuring that relevant international humanitarian law and human rights laws are followed. 
This includes not only the state itself follows these norms but also PMCs and their employees 
follow all international legislative tools that are applicable to them. In addition, states are also 
responsible for ensuring that no breaches are committed also by relevant national laws with 
regard to the activities of modern private forces. Further below, the responsibility of such 
states will be discussed: contracting states, territorial states and home states as set out in the 
Montreux document.  
3.1.1. Responsibility of a state that hires mercenaries and/or private military contractors 
One of the actors that are responsible for governing the activities of private modern forces are 
states that hire these private actors under the contract - further on referred to as contracting 
states.  
As contracting states are the ones that decide on the use of private modern forces by 
cooperating with PMCs in accordance with the contract concluded between them, usually the 
contracting states are the ones that may be most likely held accountable for the wrongful 
actions and violations committed by PMCs and their employees.  
For instance, one of the primary conditions that determines the status and activities of PMCs 
are the contracts concluded between the contracting state and the PMC in question. According 
to the contract it shall be determined in what capacity, order and under what conditions they 
should operate. For example, if the PMCs for the time of the contract will be considered as 
part of the armed forces or other state organ (which is unlikely when looking at the recent 
examples of Iraq and Afghanistan
70
) contracting state may be held responsible for any of the 
violations committed by these PMCs as determined by the Article 4 of ARS. In such a case 
there is no requirement of burden of proof whether the instructions were provided by the state 
authorities. The incorporation of PMCs into any state organs automatically are considered as 
acts of states. 
The same as under Article 5 of ARS also Article 5 may imply similar responsibility as it is 
applicable to the entities and persons that are empowered to act as governmental authority by 
national law of that state. Consequently, also in this case no proof should be provided that 
contracting state has given to PMCs the concrete instructions to act, but state may be held 
responsible in default for any violations that are committed by the PMCs if under their mutual 
contract and national law it is determined that PMCs are entitled to exercise governmental 
authority. Therefore, the responsibility of the contracting state implied by Article 5 of ARS 
depend on their national law with regard to the PMCs they contract. The problem arises due 
to the fact that in such case, it is still considered as governmental authority even if these 
PMCs would not follow the original terms of the contract by exceeding the given authority or 
contravening these instructions
71
.  
Contrary to the cases of PMC status analysed above in case of PMCs being incorporated into 
state organ of being empowered to exercise a governmental authority, the burden of proof of 
actual intentions and/or actions of the contracting state is required in cases that fall under the 
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conditions of Article 8 of ARS. For example, in the contract between the PMC and 
contracting state there are determined the activities and tasks the PMCs are ordered to 
conduct. These tasks that are determined in this contract may be attributed to the state as 
direct instructions for which activities there exists an effective control and/or command of the 
contracting state authorities. Consequently, according to Article 8 contracting state might be 
held responsible only if these instructions and commands are the reason for committing 
wrongful acts and violating existing laws. Accordingly, this Article “excludes responsibility 
for actions contrary to orders and beyond the control”72 of a contracting state. 
Therefore, contracting states tend to use the contracts in accordance with this Article so that 
they could be held responsible only for those activities determined by this contract. While any 
other activity exceeding the contract provisions would be the responsibility of PMCs rather 
than a contracting state itself as it would be almost impossible to provide such proof that 
would imply the responsibility of state for other activities of PMCs as those determined by the 
contract. Consequently, the problems arise due to the fact that PMCs are used also for the 
reason for state to diminish its responsibility. For example, for the activities of the state armed 
forces the state would be held responsible according to Article 4 of ARS as armed forces are a 
state organ. While for PMC activities contracting state would be less responsible according to 
Article 8 due to the burden of proof with regard to instructions and effective control that 
should be exercised by the contracting state in order for it to be held responsible for activities 
of PMCs.
73
   
In addition to the ARS also several international legal tools provide similar conditions. For 
instance, customary humanitarian law that is applicable to all states independently to which 
international treaties they are members to, which is also reflected in all four Geneva 
Conventions, Article 3 of Hague Convention (IV) and Article 91 of Additional Protocol I.
74
 
This customary law rule determines that state should be responsible for any of the breaches of 
international humanitarian law, such as: 
(a) violations committed by its organs, including its armed forces;  
(b) violations committed by persons or entities it empowered to exercise elements of 
governmental authority;  
(c) violations committed by persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, or 
under its direction or control; and 
(d) violations committed by private persons or groups which it acknowledges and 
adopts as its own conduct.
75
 
 
Consequently, it can be seen that similar norms and practice are required by state 
responsibility law as well as international humanitarian law, whether applicable through 
different conventions or customary law. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that international humanitarian law tools also contain specific 
legal provisions that could be directed to contracting state responsibilities with regard to 
PMCs, which imply that contracting states are responsible for instructing PMCs with relevant 
laws and train them to be aware of the norms that may not be violated. For instance, under 
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Article 172 of Geneva Convention III as well as Article 144 of Geneva Convention IV require 
that “any civilian, military or other authorities, who in time of war assume responsibilities in 
respect of protected persons”76 has to own the text of relevant legal norms and has to be 
informed on their regulations. It can be interpreted in a way that contracting states are 
responsible for ensuring that all of the PMCs that are hired have to be instructed on the 
provisions of Geneva Conventions, independently of what exact tasks are determined to the 
PMCs.
77
 
Moreover, Article 1 of all four Geneva Conventions, which is also considered to be a 
customary international law norm determines that states shall “undertake to respect and to 
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances”78, meaning that contracting 
states shall do everything in their power to also ensure that PMCs respect the provisions of 
Geneva Conventions. Meaning that by hiring PMCs contracting states also undertake to train 
them and ensure that PMCs are well aware of the requirements of these laws. In addition, 
contracting states in order to ensure respect in all circumstances should also clearly define the 
tasks assigned to the hired PMCs and provide consequences for any violations, which would 
include also having control and monitoring mechanisms. 
From the analysis above it can be seen that contracting states are obligated to several 
conditions and possible activities under international humanitarian law, some being very 
general and thus requiring interpretation with regard to their applicability to the use of PMCs. 
Nevertheless, also International Human Rights legal tools provide several obligations to states 
that could be also interpreted in a similar way as demanding contracting states to inform, 
train, control, monitor and provide consequences to the PMCs for any violations. In 
accordance with Human Rights norms contracting states have duties to “human rights 
obligations, the prevention violations, […] duty to investigate and […] prosecute and punish 
offenders.”79 Specific Human Rights provisions will not be discussed in detail. Nevertheless, 
one could rely on the possible suggestions and recommendations laid out in Montreux 
document with regard to the activities that shall be taken contracting states when hiring and 
using services of PMCs. Such as PMC hiring rules, training possibilities, licensing 
mechanisms, control and monitoring options as well as punitive measures that should be 
provided by national law of that state.
80
  
3.1.2. Responsibility of a state in which territory the activities of mercenaries and 
private military contractors are carried out and a state where PMC is 
registered or has its place of management 
Responsibility for activities of modern private forces may be attributed also to the states in 
which territory the activities of mercenaries and private military contractors are carried out - 
further on referred to as territorial states. As well as to the states of nationality of PMCs, 
meaning the place where PMC is incorporated or has its principal place of management – 
further on referred to as home states. 
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Even though there are several obligations that could be applicable to all states that are in any 
way connected with the use of private modern forces, it has to be noted that the main 
responsibility is attributed to the contracting state when it comes to following the norms of 
international laws.  
However, also territorial states and home states may be held responsible in certain 
circumstances. For example, as analysed above, Article 1 of ARS assigns the obligation to all 
states to do everything possible to avoid breaches of international law, otherwise states may 
be held responsible. This provision shall be interpreted in a way that if home states or 
territorial states would not act to the violations committed by PMCs it shall be considered as 
an act of omission, which is a wrongful act according to ARS that is entitled to the 
responsibility and possible punishment of a state. 
What is more, as it was discussed above common Article 1 of Geneva Conventions 
determines an obligation for the states to ensure respect of norms of international 
humanitarian law.
81
 Furthermore, also customary international law determines the following:  
States may not encourage violations of international humanitarian law by parties to an 
armed conflict. They must exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop 
violations of international humanitarian law.
82
 
Consequently, it can be interpreted as all states, concluding territorial and home states are 
under obligation to do all in their power to terminate any activities that could constitute a 
violation of international law. These norms are applicable either in international armed 
conflict or in non-international armed conflict.
83
  
For example, it could be interpreted that territorial states are responsible to monitor any 
activities of modern private forces that are taking place in in its territory. It has an obligation 
to react to any of the violations, whether it acts on its own or informs the contracting state, 
which may be held directly responsible of PMC activities in certain scenarios. For this 
purpose, territorial state would have to establish jurisdiction for prosecuting PMCs as well as 
certain monitoring mechanisms in order to ensure the control and notice the breaches by 
PMCs in a timely manner. Moreover, territorial state should also establish the punitive 
measures in its national law in order to be able to prosecute the PMCs. As it can be 
interpreted that territorial state is responsible for providing all necessary measures to control, 
monitor and react to the PMC activities in its territory, it can also be interpreted that in case of 
the absence of such regulations and norms in its national law territorial state might be held 
responsible for not fulfilling obligations under international humanitarian law.
84
 
With regard to the home states it can be interpreted that it has to provide information, 
education and training services to the PMCs that are incorporated or are managed from its 
state. This may include several trainings or requirements for examination or licensing 
procedures for PMC companies. Furthermore, also monitoring and control mechanisms could 
be established over the PMC companies, such as requirements for PMCs to report to the home 
state their activities. For this purpose, most likely the certain institution should be established 
or organ determined by law that would be assigned the functions of monitoring, licensing as 
well as receiving these reports. Furthermore, home state also should establish the jurisdiction 
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over PMCs in order to be able to prosecute and sanction PMCs that violate international law 
or does not comply with national laws that are established for the operation of PMCs. All of 
these activities could be considered as ensuring the respect of international humanitarian law, 
as well as non-existence of these norms and activities in national law of the home state could 
be considered as breaches of this law. Consequently, it can be interpreted that home states 
might be held responsible for failure to establish necessary norms, activities and requirements 
in their national law in order to ensure the respect to the international humanitarian law of 
PMCs by all possible means.  
Accordingly, even if majority of responsibility should be assigned to the contracting states, 
due to the reason that international law provisions provide more circumstances under which 
contracting state could be held responsible as well as contracting states are the reason for the 
use of PMCs in a concrete situation, also other states may be held responsible. Both territorial 
states and home states have to do everything in their power to ensure the compliance of 
international laws as well as termination of any illegal activities by PMCs. Accordingly, if 
territorial states or homes states fail to ensure the necessary provisions in their national law 
and operation, it may constitute a violation of ARS as well as international humanitarian law 
norms, which may result in a state responsibility with possible punitive consequences.  
3.2. Responsibility of International Organisations with regard to the 
mercenaries and private modern forces. 
Nowadays, international organisations (further referred to as IO or IOs) have become very 
active actors in armed conflicts, which also includes the use of private modern forces in their 
activities. Therefore, this subchapter will analyse the possible responsibility of IOs with 
regard to the PMCs in accordance with Draft Articles on the responsibility of international 
organisations (herewith and after below referred to as DARIO). Similar as in the analysis of 
state responsibility only the PMCs will be discussed, taking into account that responsibility 
would not differ for IOs even if certain PMCs could fall under the definition of mercenaries.  
IOs are subjects to international law and they have a separate personality
85
, thus being entitled 
to all rights and obligations encountered by legal acts it is a party to, as well as customary law 
and ius cogens norms.
86
 The same as states under ARS, IOs are responsible for any wrongful 
act committed by that IO. Any of the activities that result in a violation of international law 
constitute a wrongful act, which can entail the responsibility, independently whether this act 
is committed by the direct action or omission by an IO.
87
 This has been also determined by 
the Special Rapporteur of International Law Commission in 1994 who stated that “omissions 
are wrongful when an international organisation is required to take some positive action and 
fails to do so”88 when describing the role of the United Nations in prevention of genocide in 
Rwanda.  
From practice it can be seen that IOs may be held responsible for activities of PMCs in two 
types of cases: either PMCs are directly contracted by the IO; or in case of peacekeeping 
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operations, which consist of troop-contributing nations that hire PMCs.
89
 Nowadays, IOs are 
frequently participating in security and defence operations, therefore, also IOs have come to 
direct use of PMC services by concluding contracts with them. In such a case, IOs are also 
directly responsible for actions and violations committed by these PMCs. In case where 
peacekeeping missions are ordered by the IO, but states are the ones that contribute with 
troops or additional forces, contracts are concluded between separate member states and 
PMCs, not by the IO itself.
90
  
As mentioned before, the responsibility of IOs is mainly regulated by DARIO, which 
according to Article 1 may be applied to either - to the responsibility of IOs or responsibility 
of a state with regard to the violations that have been conducted in accordance with an IO.
91
 
Mainly, there are two scenarios under which IOs may be held responsible for violations of 
international law committed by PMCs. For example, under Article 6 of DARIO the 
responsibility of an IO is assigned when the wrongful act has been conducted by an agent or 
organ of the IO.
92
 Therefore, in case PMCs will be directly contracted by the IO and its tasks 
will be determined in this contract, most likely it will be considered to be an act of the IO. 
Consequently, IO might be held responsible for any violation of an international law 
committed by PMCs as they act under instructions and control of an organ of that IO.  
Under Article 7 of the DARIO  
[t]he conduct of an organ of a State […] that is placed at the disposal of another 
international organization shall be considered [an act of the IO if this] organization 
exercises effective control over that conduct.
93
 
Therefore, in case when IOs participate in some defence of security missions by employing 
the troops or other sources with help from the member states that contribute their own forces, 
it can be so that direct contracts are concluded between that state and PMC. But IO is still 
held responsible for the activities of these PMCs as it exercises effective control of that 
mission. Therefore, also these PMCs that are hired by states are in fact acting under the 
control and orders from the IO. 
In addition, DARIO also provides that PMCs that are acting in official capacity of the IO 
while completing the assigned tasks by that IO, are also considered to be acting as an IO. 
Consequently, the IO may be held responsible for all violations that are committed by these 
PMCs. The problems arise due to the fact that according to Article 8 of DARIO, IOs could be 
still held responsible even if these PMCs would not follow the given instructions or would 
exceed the given authority. Therefore, in certain circumstances IOs may be held responsible 
also for individual wrongdoings of PMCs if they are committed during the time of the 
contract.  
Accordingly, it can be determined that IOs are responsible for ensuring PMCs that they hire 
directly or, which are under their command even if contracted by one of the member states. 
Consequently, IOs have certain obligations also under customary international law to ensure 
that PMCs that are hired by them or act in capacity of IOs or under their command do not 
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violate international humanitarian law norms as well as respect human rights norms. This 
could include either institutional oversight mechanisms, training and education and possibly 
also some sanctions under their contracts.
94
  
3.3. Individual responsibility of mercenaries and PMC employees. 
It is clear from the analysis above that states or IOs may be held responsible for activities of 
mercenaries and PMCs. Nevertheless, also mercenaries and PMC employees may be held 
responsible for their activities. It has to be taken into account that mostly the responsibility 
will depend on the national laws of states involved as individuals are subjects rather to 
national not international laws, whether implying the civil or criminal responsibility. 
Nevertheless, human rights laws are applicable also to individuals as well as individuals may 
be subject accountability under International Criminal law for certain crimes and 
circumstances. Nevertheless, both of the levels mostly result in several difficulties with 
implication of responsibility. Further below the individual responsibility will be discussed of 
private forces and the likelihood of them being held accountable for their wrongful activities. 
Individuals are bound to follow all the applicable laws of human rights, international 
humanitarian law and national laws of the contracting state, home state and territorial state. 
First of all, as discussed in first two chapters the responsibility of an individual depends on 
the status it acquires - whether it is a mercenary, combatant or civilian. The PMCs who fall 
under the definition of a mercenary are not allowed under international humanitarian law, 
therefore, a mercenary does not have any immunities and protections that are usually given to 
combatants or civilians. Mercenaries do not fall under the scope of the protected group under 
humanitarian law, meaning that mercenaries are not protected against attacks during the 
armed conflict. As mercenaries do not enjoy any of the protections that combatants are 
entitled to, consequently, they can be prosecuted for any of the acts that are considered to be 
wrongful under the international humanitarian law, human rights law and laws of national 
state. This includes not only the direct wrongful acts committed by a mercenary, but also for 
the fact itself of being a mercenary and directly participating in hostilities.
95
 Nevertheless, as 
the definition of mercenaries is so specific, it is unlikely that PMCs of today will be 
considered as mercenaries and thus held responsible for the acts with regard to activities of 
mercenaries. 
The second status that PMC individuals may acquire in certain circumstances is a combatant. 
However, also this status is quite unlikely due to the reason that PMC employees may be 
considered to be combatants only if they are  
 incorporated into the armed forces of a [s]tate or can be considered as members of the 
armed forces,  groups or units which are under command responsible to a party to 
the conflict,
96
  
otherwise they most likely will be considered as civilians. However, the probability that 
PMCs will be included into the armed forces of state or will act under direct instructions from 
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state organs is unlikely to happen as it is completely opposite to the essence of the meaning of 
private forces as such. 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that PMCs that will be defined as combatants will be entitled 
to prisoner of war status as well as will be immune against any prosecutions of activities that 
are considered to be legitimate under international humanitarian law, but could be defined as 
crimes under national laws. For instance, combatants will not be prosecuted for killing other 
armed forces during the conflict. Nevertheless, combatants still can be prosecuted for such 
crimes as inhuman treatment, war crimes, genocide and other large scale crimes.  
As it is difficult to define PMCs as mercenaries or combatants it is most likely that they will 
be considered as civilians. Civilians as such or civilians accompanying the armed forces if 
they will meet the requirements of Article 4(4) of Geneva Convention III.
97
 If they are 
considered to be civilians that accompany armed forces PMCs will be entitled of prisoner of 
war status, nevertheless, they are not combatants. Consequently, these PMCs will be immune 
from crimes determined in international humanitarian law as long as they do not participate in 
hostilities. Civilians in general are a protected group, however, if they participate in hostilities 
and get involved in the armed conflict they can be attacked. The problem arises due to the fact 
that these PMC civilians may be prosecuted for any activities that are considered unlawful 
under national laws and international laws, such as killing a person. In addition, civilians may 
be prosecuted for the fact it self that they are participating in hostilities as civilians under 
international humanitarian law are not allowed to actively take part in hostilities.
98
 Therefore, 
e.g. if PMCs that are defined as civilians accompanying armed forces are entitled to some 
protections under international laws, they are not able to become combatants even if 
participating in hostilities. But at the same time may be held accountable for activities that 
would normally be considered as lawful acts under international humanitarian law - like 
participating in hostilities.
99
 
Even though as mentioned above in the previous subchapters, states are obliged to establish 
national jurisdiction and necessary laws to be able to prosecute PMC individuals for their 
activities in order to comply with international law norms, it has not been that well fulfilled in 
reality. There are several shortcomings when it comes to the states implementing the relevant 
laws. As well as frequently there are disputes with regard to which state has an obligation or 
right to prosecute concrete individuals. In addition, states are frequently limited to their 
abilities to investigate and gather proof of concrete activities that have been carried out by 
PMCs. Apart from that, frequently states that are involved in conflicts and use of PMCs 
conclude agreements that provide immunity to the PMCs, which makes it even more difficult 
to hold them accountable. Consequently, not only the problems arise in international level 
whether there are difficulties in defining PMCs and their status as it is done on case by case 
basis, but also when the status of a person is clear there are several difficulties to actually 
sentence these PMCs under national laws due to their shortcomings in law and practice.  
If PMCs commit such large sale crimes as genocide, some war crimes or crimes against 
humanity, the employees may be held accountable not only in accordance with national law, 
but also international law. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (further referred 
to as Rome Statute) determines the grounds for individual criminal responsibility in Article 
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25. Under this article individual may be held responsible and be punished if it commits a 
crime that is covered by the jurisdiction of International Criminal Court (further referred to as 
ICC). The person may be held accountable independently whether the crime was committed 
solely or in cooperation with others. What is more, individual may be held responsible if 
he/she “orders, solicits or induces”100 such a crime or “aids, abets or otherwise assists”101 or in 
any way collaborates in this crime.  
Even though Rome Statute has established the basis for the prosecution of individuals for 
serious crimes, such as war crimes there are several problems with actual execution of the 
protection. For instance, ICC is able to prosecute individuals for only such crimes if they are 
“committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such 
crimes,”102 which is frequently hard or even impossible to prove. In addition, also the criteria 
for crimes against humanity are difficult to fulfil as it is determined that crimes against 
humanity are only those activities, which are “of a widespread or systematic practice [and are 
part of] state or organisational policy”.103 Furthermore, ICC can mainly prosecute cases where 
the criminals are connected with parties to the Rome Statutes, which makes it even more 
difficult. What is more, the actual case prosecution would also strongly depend on the 
cooperation with nation states as the assistance with investigation and evidence gathering 
would have to be carried out by state parties. 
Rome Statutes also establish the responsibility for such individuals as commanders and 
superiors not only the PMC employees that directly participate in the conflicts. Article 28 of 
Rome Statutes determine that responsible may be also a person who is a “military commander 
or person effectively acting as a military commander”104 that exercises effective control as 
well as superiors that exercise effective control over persons committing actual acts. This 
includes not only the direct acts and commands from these commands and superiors, but also 
failures to act, similarly as it was for responsibility of states and international organisations. If 
commanders or superiors gave instructions for commission of wrongful act or failed to 
instruct their employees to terminate such activities (if they were aware of such activities) 
they may be held responsible under Rome Statute as well as under domestic laws, if 
established by the states that have jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, there are several discussions about inequality of treatment of majority of PMCs  
and state armed forces due to the fact that armed forces are entitled to be combatants while 
PMCs in majority of cases are not. Consequently, PMCs frequently may be prosecuted for the 
same activities as to combatants have protection from, which is an issue of unequal treatment. 
Nevertheless, PMCs may be held accountable for several crimes under national or 
international law in several different jurisdictions - jurisdiction of contracting state, home 
state, territorial state or in International Criminal Court for certain crimes. 
3.4. Corporate responsibility of PMCs. 
                                                 
100
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 1 July 2002), Article 25 (b) 
101
 Ibid. Article 25(c) 
102
 Huskey Kristine A. “Accountability for Private Military and Security Contractors in the International Legal 
Regime,” Criminal Justice Ethics, Vo. 31, No. 3 (2012), p.202 
103
 Ibid.  
104
 Op. cit. Rome Statute, Article 28 
41 
 
The use of PMCs has risen another contemporary issue such as the corporate responsibility of 
the entity itself, not only individual responsibility of PMC employees. Unfortunately, it has to 
be noted that it is a quite unclear field that has not been fully developed in existent 
jurisdictions. First of all, it has to be taken into account that international law, such as 
international humanitarian law legal tools or Rome Statute has not established the jurisdiction 
over PMC entities. Consequently, the corporate responsibility is completely the field of 
national jurisdictions that have not been implemented that well either. Nevertheless, corporate 
responsibility would be adequate and necessary in several of the cases, especially when it 
comes to damages and compensations that would have to be paid once punished as PMC 
entities are mainly financially well-provided. 
However, as corporate responsibility is more difficult to be obtained, in practice mainly the 
individual responsibility of PMC employees is being considered. The corporate responsibility 
is considered only in cases where the organisation structure of the PMC is established in a 
way to make it difficult to prosecute the individuals.
105
 However, more frequently individual 
employees are being held responsible for acts that are committed by the company itself. Even 
though often it would be more beneficial to prosecute a company rather than an individual, it 
is more difficult to prove the fault of the company. In addition, as no international institution 
has a jurisdiction to prosecute and punish the PMC corporate entities it is left for the states to 
establish their own national laws. Due to the insufficiencies in these laws with regard to 
corporate liability for crimes conducted in the time of armed conflict it can be concluded that 
majority of national laws are not able to prosecute corporations. Moreover, it is more likely 
that the individuals, such as the usual employees, superiors and commanders will be 
prosecuted for the crimes committed rather than a company itself.
106
 
Consequently, corporate responsibility is being established only in rare occasions where states 
such as contracting states, home states or territorial states have established national 
jurisdiction and sufficient regulation and punishment options. Nevertheless, it has to be taken 
into account that in cases where states that are parties of the conflict make an agreement 
where indicating that PMCs are immune from prosecution, PMC entities also would be 
protected from responsibility and possible punishment.  
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CHAPTER IV SUFFICIENCY OF EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
REGULATING STATE AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 
OF MERCENARIES AND PRIVATE MILITARY 
CONTRACTORS  
In this thesis there were analysed several aspects of existing international legal tools when 
examining the activities of mercenaries and PMCs with a purpose to hold someone 
accountable for wrongful acts committed by these private forces. It can be seen that there are 
several legal acts that could be used for analysing the activities of PMCs, nevertheless they 
have several shortcomings for them to sufficiently ensure the accountability. Therefore, this 
chapter will focus on providing possible alternatives for ensuring the better practice and 
options for assigning the responsibility for the wrongful acts committed as well as solutions 
for reducing the amount of crimes committed.  
As discussed above, the first insufficiency that is problematic in the basis of the existing law 
is the lack of adequate definition of mercenaries and PMCs. The definition of mercenaries is 
so specific and inflexible that it will almost never be applicable to the modern forces used 
today. The definition of PMCs does not exist in any of the binding international legal tools, 
therefore, the statuses of mercenaries, combatants and civilians have to be applied to PMCs, 
which is not sufficient for adequately analysing the activities of these modern forces. Even 
though the newly established Montreux document contains a definition of PMCs, it is not 
legally binding and none of the rules contained imply any legal obligations. 
What is more, the several of existing legal tools also have problems not only with regard to 
definition, but also with lack of ratification or territorial limitations. For example, the only 
legal tools that criminalise the activities of mercenaries are OAU Convention, which is 
applicable only to African states and UN Convention, which is barely ratified. Therefore, as a 
result they are almost inapplicable to the conflicts today.  
Furthermore, none of the existing legal tools contain any mechanisms of monitoring or 
ensuring the enforcement of the existing norms. Consequently, it can be seen that there are 
several international legal tools that could be applicable in order to hold responsible either 
states, international organisations, individuals, but the norms will be open to interpretation 
with regard to PMCs, frequently will not be enforceable, while corporate responsibility is not 
established in international legal tools at all. Therefore, a large burden is put to the nation 
states to establish their jurisdiction and domestic laws in a way so that PMCs and their 
employees could be held responsible, which has also been fulfilled only partly, depending on 
a state.  
As the use of private modern forces is increasing in conflicts nowadays it is important to have 
a sufficient legal framework for regulating their activities as well as there is a necessity for 
legal norms of accountability of activities committed by mercenaries and PMCs. It has been 
discussed that there are several international legal tools that regulate the activities of 
mercenaries and PMCs. However, international legal framework lacks several important 
issues of regulation but new proposed helpful tools do not imply any obligations. 
Consequently, “if the international community fails […] to create effective international law, 
[…] accountability of PMCs will be left to the formal and informal devices of the individual 
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state.”107 Therefore, this chapter further on will discuss not only the possible solutions that 
can be done in international level, but also touch upon the alternatives that can be 
implemented by individual states in their national laws.  
The first proposed solution is to establish a new legal tool for PMCs, which would include the 
appropriate definition of PMCs that could be applicable. This definition also should include 
references to whether PMCs will be entitled to any of the statuses determined by international 
humanitarian law, such as combatants or civilians, or whether there will be established a new 
status for PMCs and their employees specifically. Moreover, also the responsibilities of states, 
international organisations, individuals and legal entities should be described in order for 
better understanding and implementation also in internal practices of states. In addition, this 
tool should be prepared in a way so that it would not revoke the already exiting legal 
humanitarian or human rights conventions. Furthermore, it should include also the minimal 
requirements that should be implemented into national laws of its member states. The new 
legal tool could use basis of the Montreux document as it is well supported already at this 
moment. However, this new proposed legal document should be binding to all its members. In 
addition, it could be beneficial if in this new convention there would be and opportunity of 
supplement or amend it after reaching the unanimity or absolute majority. As well as there 
should be an opportunity to make reservations in order to increase the number of states that 
would ratify the convention if they will have a chance to opt-out from provisions that they are 
completely against to. Furthermore, this convention should include certain monitoring and 
control mechanisms as well as enforcement plan. 
One of the ways how the new document could be enforced is establishment of an institution 
together with this convention. For instance, institution could be proposed and sponsored by 
the United Nations. Or the institution could be formed from the states that worked together in 
order to create the Montreux document. If the Montreux document would be made as basis for 
the new convention, it would be sensible that also the creators of this document would be in 
the institution of a new convention. The institution could also be responsible for monitoring 
and control mechanisms in order to ensure the validity and enforcement of this convention. 
The institution would need to have voting rights that are either unanimous or with absolute 
majority in order to ensure a larger number of states that would ratify the convention and 
implement its relevant norms also in its national legislation (for instance such norms as 
minimal criteria for licensing systems or punishment requirements).  
With regard to the licensing system, it could be useful if there would be one institution and 
one licensing scheme that issues these licenses for all PMCs. This would ensure the equal and 
determined standards for all PMCs and their employees. Unfortunately, most likely such 
alternative would be denied due to “the lack of funding and consensus among states.”108 
Consequently, the idea of common licensing system should be established as a 
recommendation, but the enforcement and implementation should be left for the states to 
carry out. Nevertheless, the minimum licensing criteria should be stated also in international 
level, for instance, determined with help of the proposed new convention or institution. 
Furthermore, such an institution could make a blacklist of PMCs that are not able to fulfil the 
criteria, therefore, may not be used as long as there exist these insufficiencies with minimal 
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criteria or there have been too many violations by the PMC.
109
 This would motivate PMCs to 
acquire licenses and follow the existing international and national regulations. 
Furthermore, in this convention it should be indicated in which order such states as 
contracting states, home states and territorial states are responsible to prosecute the PMCs of 
wrongful acts. Also some guidelines for cooperation between states with regard to 
investigation and evidence could be discussed in order to facilitate the process of sentencing 
PMCs as accountable for the wrongful acts as well as provide possible punishment options. 
The establishment of an institution and proposal of a new international convention will have 
several difficulties. For instance, it will be time and finance consuming, which will encumber 
the process of creating this new legal tool. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that states will 
ratify the convention, even if they intended to during the process of negotiations, which may 
lead to the consequence to establish another legal tool, which again will not be applicable in 
majority of cases. 
Apart from establishing new international legal tools or institutions with new obligations, 
several solutions could be performed by the national states already from the existing legal 
norms. For instance, states could take an example from the Montreux document and 
implement majority of the suggestions from guidelines in their domestic laws in order to 
establish appropriate jurisdiction and national laws for adequately dealing with PMCs. For 
instance, states should undertake to set the minimal requirements for hiring the PMC, which 
could be obtained by introducing licensing schemes and procedures in their national laws. 
Licensing schemes could be accomplished by either contracting, home or territorial states as 
all of them can have certain minimal criteria that would allow the operation of PMCs.
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 The system must be supplemented by national criminal [and civil] laws, oversight and 
enforcement  mechanisms in order to provide control, effectiveness and 
efficiency.
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All national states should undertake the obligations to carry out education and training 
programs
112
 for PMCs in order to introduce them with necessary laws and prohibitions, as 
well as possible punishments for wrongful activities.  
States should introduce the relevant jurisdiction and laws in order to be able to prosecute both 
- either PMC as an entity or its personnel as individual persons. In addition, certain 
monitoring and control mechanisms should be proposed - for instance the minimum amount 
of the times PMC employees should report back to the entity as well as PMC as a company to 
report back to the state that hired the private forces. This could help with tracking the 
wrongful activities faster as well as would be beneficial for investigations and evidence 
collection. 
Consequently, there are several possibilities that may be proposed as solutions for 
accountability issues of mercenaries and PMCs in international and national level. 
Nevertheless, the main necessities are: legally binding adequate definition of PMCs, clear 
determination of responsibility of states, international organisations, individuals and legal 
entities; as well as necessary monitoring and control mechanisms. Several minimum criteria 
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such as licensing criteria and accountability of all actors should be determined in both levels - 
national and international in order to ensure its reliability and enforcement. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
Private modern forces are used more frequently in armed conflicts nowadays. Unfortunately, 
the industry of modern private forces has developed much faster than the existing 
international legal tools as well as applicable national laws. 
This thesis analysed the existing legal tools in order to examine the applicability and 
sufficiency of them to modern private forces and possible accountability with regard to the 
activities of mercenaries and PMCs. For instance, it was analysed that the existing legal tools 
have developed very specific and inflexible definition of mercenaries, which arises several 
problems due to the fact that it is almost inapplicable to the modern private forces used today. 
Moreover, the definition of PMCs does not exist at all in any of the binding legal tools, which 
results in several difficulties as PMCs may be defined either as mercenaries, combatants or 
civilians under international humanitarian law. Unfortunately, also the application of such 
statuses to the PMCs is not unanimous, but depends on case by case basis interpretation of the 
legal norms to the specific situation.  
Furthermore, also the role of the existing international legal tools was discussed in examining 
the activities of mercenaries and PMCs while determining that the existing legal conventions 
either have serious shortcomings with regard to PMCs or the legal instruments that are more 
sufficient in terms of the content lacks the ratification or is limited to certain territories, 
therefore, is also not applicable in majority of cases. Consequently, it can be concluded that 
there exist several international legal instruments but none of them is sufficient in examining 
the activities of modern private forces. 
In addition, also the responsibility of states and IOs was analysed as well as individual and 
corporate responsibility. Responsibility of states can be interpreted from several legal acts that 
could be applicable to the armed conflicts, nevertheless, due to the non-existent definition of 
PMCs and inflexible definition of mercenaries, several difficulties arise with regard to the 
interpretation of applicability of certain norms to issues with regard to activities of modern 
private forces.  
It was also discussed that in order to fulfil several international norms states would be obliged 
to act in order to establish the national jurisdiction and applicable national law, which also has 
not been often fulfilled due to the lack of control and enforcement mechanisms of 
international law tools. Consequently, a very good example of guidelines was established with 
help of Montreux document. Unfortunately it is not legally binding and thus does not imply 
any obligations to act. Nevertheless it can be used as guidelines in order for national states to 
establish their jurisdiction, national laws and requirements for private modern forces into their 
national laws. 
It was concluded that even more than for state responsibility and responsibility of IOs, there 
are several problems with regard to individual and corporate responsibility of PMCs. For 
instance, if individual responsibility is being considered in both levels – international and 
domestic, corporate responsibility is completely dependent on national laws of states, which 
have not been that well established. Individual responsibility depends on the status awarded to 
the PMC – mercenary, combatant or civilian, which was found to be difficult. Moreover, due 
to the different statuses of PMCs also the accountability consequences differ quite a lot. 
International criminal law under Rome Statute mainly can deal with cases only of large scale 
crimes in the conflict, such as war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity. 
Unfortunately, the difficulties arise when conducting investigations and gathering evidence 
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with regard to the fulfilment of the definitions of such crimes that can be prosecuted under 
ICC. Therefore, the prosecution of PMCs under Rome Statute is quite rare, thus leaving this 
responsibility to states that have to establish their national laws and jurisdictions in order to 
prosecute PMCs and hold them responsible for the wrongful acts committed.  
Accordingly, the answer to the thesis research question is that there are numerous 
complications that can arise when assessing the conduct of mercenaries and PMCs in the 
existing legal framework. Starting from the lack of adequate definition that can be applicable 
to the modern private forces; lack of ratification of certain legal tools; as well as ambiguities 
when it comes to determining the responsibility of territorial, contracting or home states, IOs, 
individuals or corporate entities, thus frequently resulting in non-existent accountability of the 
acts of mercenaries and PMCs at all. 
The last chapter provides as well some alternatives, such as a new legal instrument that would 
be binding as well as establishment of responsible institution in order to ensure the control, 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, also the licensing system of PMCs was 
proposed in order to ensure that they are educated, trained and evaluated by responsible state 
or institution. In addition, proposals were made also for guidelines to national states that 
would have to adopt their national laws in accordance with international norms. 
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